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Some comments about
A. Ronald Gallant’s “Reflections
on the probability space
induced by moment conditions
with implications for Bayesian
inference”
Christian P. Robert
Universite´ Paris-Dauphine, CEREMADE, and CREST, Paris
Abstract. This note is commenting on Ronald Gallant’s (2015) reflec-
tions on the construction of Bayesian prior distributions from moment
conditions. The main conclusion is that the paper does not deliver a
working principle that could justify inference based on such priors.
1. INTRODUCTION
The construction of prior distributions has always been a central aspect of
Bayesian analysis, arguably the central piece since all aspects of Bayesian in-
ference are automatically derived from defining the model, the prior, the data
and the loss function (Berger, 1985). While the prior is a mathematical object,
there is not rigorous derivation of a given prior distribution from the available
information or lack thereof and, while “objective Bayes” constructions are auto-
mated to some extent (Lhoste, 1923; Jeffreys, 1939; Broemeling and Broemeling,
2003; Berger et al., 2009), they are rejected by subjectivist Bayesians who argue
in favour of personalistic and non-reproducible prior selection (Kadane, 2011).
Defining priors via moment conditions can be traced at least back to Jaynes
(2003) and the notion of maximum entropy priors, even though the moment con-
ditions only involve the parameters θ of the model. The current paper considers
instead moment conditions as defined jointly on the pair (x, θ) and proposes some
necessary conditions for a prior distribution to be compatible with those condi-
tions. From a foundational perspective, a setting where the joint distribution of
the data and the parameter that drives this data is a given is hard to fathom,
because it implies there is no longer a fixed parameter to infer about. In addi-
tion, the term “exogeneity” used in the paper hints at a notion of the parameter
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2being not truly a parameter, but including rather latent variables and maybe
random effects. It is hard to reconcile this motivation with a computational one
(also found in the paper) where complex likelihoods would justify calling for a
prior as a practical tool. The additional reformulation of a (pseudo-)likelihood
function defined by the method of moments (Section 2) makes the focus of the
paper difficult to specify and hence analyse.
Given the introduction through Fisher’s (1930) fiducial distribution, one may
wonder whether or not the author’s approach is to integrate fiducial constructs
within the Bayesian paradigm or at the very least to specify under which con-
ditions this can be achieved. As a long-time sceptic on the relevance of fiducial
arguments, I doubt about one’s ability to produce an arbitrary distribution on
an equally arbitrary transform of the pair (x, θ), instead of a genuine prior ×
likelihood construct. For instance, the discussion around the various meanings of
the t statistic
x¯− θ
s/
√
n
does not imply that it can achieve a t posterior distribution with n − 1 degrees
of freedom jointly for all sample sizes n and I doubt it can happen outside exotic
cases like Dirac masses on one of the terms. (Exchanging the randomness of terms
in a random variable as if it were a linear equation is a guaranteed way to produce
fiducial paradoxes and measure theoretic difficulties.)
This set of comments on Gallant (2015) is organised as follows: in Section
2, I analyse various and somewhat mutually exclusive aspects of the author’s
approach, while in Section 3, I discuss some computational consequences and
alternatives.
2. DERIVING PRIORS FROM MOMENTS
2.1 Moment default likelihood
Gallant (2015) considers the distribution of a pivotal quantity like
Z =
√
nW (x, θ)−1/2m(x, θ)
as induced by the hypothetical joint distribution on (x, θ), hence conversely induc-
ing constraints on this joint, as well as an associated conditional. (The constraints
may be such that the joint distribution does not exist.) However, this perspective
is abandoned a few lines below to define a moment likelihood
p(x|θ) = (2pi)−M/2 exp{−n/2 m¯(x, θ)T[W (x, θ)]−1m¯(x, θ)}
as a quasi-Gaussian pseudo-likelihood in the moment m¯(x, θ). This is only one
among many ways of defining a likelihood from moments, but it further removes
the symmetry in x and θ induced by the original formulation. In addition, one
may wonder why a determinant like det{W (x, θ)}−1/2 or at least a normalising
constant (obviously depending on θ) does not appear in the pseudo-likelihood,
since this impacts the resulting posterior density.
A connected reference is Zellner’s (1997) Bayesian method of moments where,
given moment conditions on the parameters θ and σ2,
E[θ|x1, . . . , xn] = x¯n , E[σ2|x1, . . .] = s2n , var(θ|σ2, x1, . . .) = σ2/n ,
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Zellner (1997) derives a maximum entropy posterior
θ|σ2, x1, . . . ∼ N (x¯n, σ2/n) , σ−2|x1, . . . ∼ Exp(s2n) ,
later shown to be incompatible with the corresponding predictive distribution,
besides producing an inconsistent estimator of σ2 (Geisser, 1999).1
2.2 Measure-theoretic considerations
“If one specifies a set of moment functions collected together into a vector m(x, θ)
of dimension M , regards θ as random and asserts that some transformation Z(x, θ)
has distribution ψ then what is required to use this information and then possibly
a prior to make valid inference?” (p.4)
The central question in the paper is determining whether a set of moment
equations
(1) E[m(X1, . . . ,Xn, θ)] = 0
(where both the Xis and θ are a priori random) leads to a well-defined pair
of a likelihood function and a prior distribution compatible with those. From
a mathematical perspective, this seems to be a highly complex question as it
implies the integral equation
∫
Θ×Xn
m(x1, . . . , xn, θ)pi(θ)f(x1|θ) · · · f(xn|θ)dθ dx1 · · · dxn = 0
must allow for a solution for all n’s.
Still from a purely mathematical perspective, the problem as stated in Section
3.3 of Gallant (2015) is puzzling: if the distribution of the transform Z = Z(X,Λ)
is provided, what are the consequences on the joint distribution of (X,Λ)? It
is conceivable but rather unlikely that this distribution ψ will induce a single
joint, that is, a single prior and a single likelihood. It is much more likely that
the distribution ψ one arbitrarily selects on m(x, θ) is incompatible with a joint
distribution on (x, θ). To wit, Fisher’s example of the t statistic and of its tn−1
distribution.
“Typically C is coarse in the sense that it does not contain all the Borel sets (...)
The probability space cannot be used for Bayesian inference.” (p.8)
My understanding of that part of the paper is that defining a joint on m(x, θ)
is not always enough to deduce a (unique) posterior on θ, which is fine and cor-
rect, but definitely anticlimactic. This sounds to be what Gallant calls a “partial
specification of the prior” (p.9). Hence, rather than building the minimal Borel
σ-algebra on X × Θ compatible with this joint on m(x, θ), I would suggest ex-
amining the range of prior×likelihood pairs that agree with this partial property
when using the regular Borel σ-algebra.
The general solution found in Section 3.5 (“The Abstraction”) relies on the
assumptions that Z(·, θ) is a surjective function for all θ’s and on the axiom
of choice, namely that an antecedent of the function can be selected for each
z ∈ Z, namely, Υ(z, θ) = x⋆ such that Z(x⋆, θ) = z. Under these assumptions,
Z and Υ(Z, θ) are in one-to-one correspondence and hence can enjoy the same
1In essence, the prior changes for each sample size n. Geisser (1999) designates the Maxent
principle per se as the culprit for this incoherence.
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4distribution modulo the proper change of variable. The distribution over X is then
obtained by assuming a uniform distribution over the orbit of Z(x, θ) = Z(x∗, θ),
leading to
p⋆(x|θ) = ψ(Z(x, θ))
as defined in Equation (17). There is no issue about this derivation but, as noted
previously, there is neither a compelling reason to adopt the smallest σ-algebra
C∗ to make the above a proper density in X . I see little appeal in using this new
measure and further wonder in which sense this defines a likelihood function, i.e.,
the product of n densities of the Xis conditional on θ. To me this is the central
issue, which remains unsolved by the paper.
2.3 Computational motivations
“A common situation that requires consideration of the notions that follow is that
deriving the likelihood from a structural model is analytically intractable and one
cannot verify that the numerical approximations one would have to make to circum-
vent the intractability are sufficiently accurate.” (p.7)
This computational perspective then is a completely different issue, namely
that defining a joint distribution by mean of moment equations prevents regular
Bayesian inference when the likelihood function is intractable. This point of view
is much more exciting because (i) there are alternatives available, from approx-
imate Bayesian computation (ABC) (Marin et al., 2011) to INLA (Rue et al.,
2008), to EP (Barthelme´ and Chopin, 2014), to variational Bayes (Jaakkola and Jordan,
2000). In particular, the moment equations are strongly and even insistently sug-
gesting that empirical likelihood techniques (Owen, 2001; Lazar, 2003) could be
well-suited to this setting. And (ii) it is no longer a mathematical puzzle: there ex-
ists a joint distribution on m(x, θ), induced by one (or many) joint distribution(s)
on (x, θ). Hence, the question of finding whether or not this item of information
leads to a single proper prior on θ becomes irrelevant. However, in the event one
wants to rely on ABC, being given the distribution of m(x, θ) seems to mean
one can solely generate new values of this transform while missing a natural dis-
tance between observations and pseudo-observations, although the log-likelihood
of m(xobs, θ) could itself be used as a distance.
As an aside, the author mentions marginal likelihood estimation by harmonic
means a` la Newton and Raftery (1994), but I would like to point out this usually is
a rather poor solution with potential for disaster, while it requires the likelihood
function to be available in closed form. It is also unclear to me why marginal
likelihood is mentioned at this stage.
3. A FORM OF ABC?
“These characteristics are (1) likelihood is not available; (2) prior information is
available; (3) a portion of the prior information is expressed in terms of functionals
of the model that cannot be converted into an analytic prior on model parameters;
(4) the model can be simulated. Our approach depends on an assumption that (5) an
adequate statistical model for the data are available.” R. Gallant and R. McCulloch
(2009)
As a final comment connected with the computational aspect of the current
paper, I would like to point out Gallant’s and McCulloch’s (2009) connections
with the ABC approach, to wit the above quote.
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In Gallant and McCulloch (2009), the true (scientific) model parametrised by
θ is replaced with a (statistical) substitute that is available in closed form and
parametrised by g(θ). which states that the intractable density is equal to a
closed-form density.] This latter model is over-parametrised when compared with
the scientific model. Take, e.g., a N (θ, θ2) scientific model versus a N (µ, σ2) sta-
tistical model. In addition, the prior information is only available on the param-
eter θ. However, this does not seem to matter very much since (a) the Bayesian
analysis is operated on θ only and (b) the Metropolis approach adopted by the
authors involves simulating a massive number of pseudo-observations, given the
current value of the parameter θ and the scientific model, so that the transform
g(θ) can be estimated by maximum likelihood over the statistical model. The
paper suggests using a secondary Markov chain algorithm to find this MLE. The
pseudo-model is then used in a primary MCMC step.
Hence, the approach of Gallant and McCulloch (2009) is not truly an ABC
algorithm. In the same setting, ABC would indeed use one simulated dataset,
with the same size as the observed dataset, compute the MLEs for both and
compare them (as in Drovandi et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2014). This approach
is faster if less accurate when Assumption 1—that the statistical model holds for
a restricted parametrisation—does not stand.
4. CONCLUSION
One overall interrogation about this paper is the validation of the outcome.
As noted in Fraser (2011), Bayesian posterior distributions are not naturally
endowed with an epistemic validity. The same questioning obviously applies to
entities defined outside the Bayesian paradigm, the present one included, in that
producing a posterior or pseudo-posterior distribution on the parameter offers no
guarantee per se about the efficiency of the inference it produces. Using asymp-
totically convergent approximations to the likelihood function does not always
lead to consistent Bayesian approximations (Marin et al., 2014) and thus requires
further validation of the procedures proposed here.
Another global interrogation that remains open is the validation of the income
outside of the Bayesian paradigm. The production of the equation (1) has to
occur as a byproduct of defining a joint probability model on the space X × Θ,
which seems to logically exclude both non-Bayesian perspectives and ex nihilo
occurrences of moment conditions. The only statistics example worked out in the
paper, namely habit persistence asset pricing, starts with a given prior distribu-
tion (31), which makes this example irrelevant for the stated goal of checking
whether or not “the assertion of a distribution for moment functions either par-
tially or completely specifies the prior”.
Despite these difficulties in apprehending the paper postulate, I would like
to conclude with a more positive perspective, namely that the problematic of
partially defining models and priors via moment conditions is of considerable
interest in an era of Big Data, small worlds (Savage, 1954), and limited informa-
tion. Acknowledging that inference and in particular Bayesian inference cannot al-
ways handle big worlds (see, e.g., the paradox exposed in Robins and Wasserman,
2000) and constructing coherent and efficient tools for restricted inference about
some aspects of the model are very current questions that beg addressing in full
generality.
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